“Confessed NSA Leaker Holed Up In Hong Kong Hotel”

June 10, 2013

NPR on June 10, 2013 released the following:

Confessed NSA Leaker Holed Up In Hong Kong Hotel

by Frank Langfitt”

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
International Extradition Lawyers Videos:

International Extradition – When the FBI Seeks Extradition

International Extradition – Wire Transfer – Email – Telephone Call

————————————————————–

We previously discussed the extradition treaty between the United States and Hong Kong here.

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

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International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

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“Edward Snowden: Why the NSA whistleblower fled to Hong Kong”

June 10, 2013

The Christian Science Monitor on June 10, 2013 released the following:

“The man who leaked the NSA secrets to The Guardian newspaper says Hong Kong is one of the few places that both could and would resist the dictates of the US government.

By Peter Ford, Staff Writer

BEIJING

Edward Snowden, the man who leaked NSA secrets to The Guardian newspaper, has chosen either luckily or on extremely good advice by seeking refuge in Hong Kong from possible prosecution.

A quirk of judicial history means Mr. Snowden could be safe from any US attempt to extradite him “for months if not years,” according to one of the former British colony’s top legal experts, Simon Young.

Though it is unlikely Snowden would be able to spend the rest of his life in Hong Kong, he will be able to use the protections afforded by Hong Kong’s judicial system, which is independent of the Chinese government.

If Snowden chooses to ask for political asylum, says Professor Young, head of the Centre for Comparative and Public Law at Hong Kong University, “he is going nowhere” in the foreseeable future. A recent appeals court ruling, he explains, means that “the government cannot return anyone who claims that he will be persecuted” in the country he came from.

That is because Hong Kong’s asylum law is “a black hole,” Young says. In the wake of the court ruling last March, the government cannot continue simply to follow rulings by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the merits of an asylum claimant’s case, as it has always done until now.

The Court of Final Appeal ruled that the government must independently determine the validity of asylum claims, but the authorities have devised no system for doing so. Legislation setting up such a system would take “months if not years,” says Young, and any administrative plan the government instituted before a law was passed would be subject to challenge in the courts.

“Short of a criminal group getting to him, I think he is safe here,” Young adds.

Snowden told The Guardian in an interview published Sunday that he had flown to Hong Kong on May 20, because “they have a spirited commitment to free speech and the right of political dissent.”

The Guardian also said he believed Hong Kong was “one of the few places in the world that both could and would resist the dictates of the US government.”

The United States and Hong Kong signed an extradition treaty in 1996, shortly before Hong Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty. Article 6 provides that “a fugitive offender shall not be surrendered if the offence of which that person is accused or was convicted is an offence of a political character.”

If the US government does indict Snowden, and then asks the Hong Kong government to extradite him, the Chief Executive might refuse on the grounds of another clause in the treaty allowing him not to surrender a fugitive if doing so might implicate “the defense, foreign affairs or essential public interest or policy” of the Chinese government in Beijing.

“Hong Kong will have to take instructions from Beijing on this,” predicts Michael Davis, a Politics professor at Hong Kong University. “And I cannot see how Beijing benefits from tweaking the US” by refusing an extradition request.

Should Beijing and the Hong Kong government agree to an extradition, however, it would be subject to judicial approval, and Snowden could decide to argue in court that he leaked information about NSA spying programs for political reasons, portraying any crime of which he might be accused as “an offence of a political character.”

Snowden might not win such a case in the end; nor would the courts necessarily grant him asylum, even when the relevant laws and regulations have been approved, because they might not regard prosecution in a US court as “persecution.”

But “one can take full advantage of Hong Kong’s legal system to challenge issues that may arise … and that could take a long time,” predicts Young.

“He has made a very wise decision” to go to Hong Kong, adds the lawyer. “But I would counsel him to get legal advice.” ”

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Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
International Extradition Lawyers Videos:

International Extradition – When the FBI Seeks Extradition

International Extradition – Wire Transfer – Email – Telephone Call

————————————————————–

We previously discussed the extradition treaty between the United States and Hong Kong here.

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

Free Skype Tel: +1.202.470.3427, OR

Free Skype call:

           Office Locations

Email:


“Beyond Hong Kong: Edward Snowden’s best options for asylum”

June 10, 2013
Edward Snowden
“Edward Snowden explained that he had chosen Hong Kong because it ‘has a strong tradition of free speech’. Photograph: The Guardian/AFP/Getty Images”

The Guardian on June 10, 2013 released the following:

“Choice of Hong Kong as refuge is admired, but speculation remains that he could seek sanctuary in Iceland

[BY] Owen Bowcott and Alexandra Topping

Edward Snowden’s choice of Hong Kong as a refuge from US retribution has been admired by some international lawyers – but it has not quelled speculation that he may seek asylum in another state thereafter, and activists in Iceland are making preparations should the whistleblower try to head there.

Hong Kong is a separate jurisdiction from China and has an extradition treaty with the United States, but the agreement has exceptions – including for crimes deemed to be political. In his video interview with the Guardian, Snowden, 29, an IT contractor, explained that he had chosen the semi-autonomous territory because “Hong Kong has a strong tradition of free speech”.

Under Hong Kong’s Fugitives Offenders Ordinance, however, China can issue an “instruction” to the city’s leader to take or not take action on extraditions where the interests of China “in matters of defence or foreign affairs would be significantly affected”.

One US lawyer, Douglas McNabb, a Houston-based extradition expert, said it would not be difficult for the United States to provide justification for any request. “This guy came out and said: ‘I did it,'” he commented. “[Snowden’s] best defence would probably be that this is a political case instead of a criminal one.”

Other states being mentioned where Snowden might seek sanctuary have included Ecuador, whose embassy in London is currently home to the fugitive WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange, Venezuela and Iceland – where WikiLeaks has received support.

Iceland’s ministry of the interior – which would have the final say on whether Snowden received asylum – denied that it had received any application from the whistleblower.

“We have heard about this, but we cannot speculate,” said Johannes Tomasson, spokesman for the ministry. “At the moment we have received no inquiry or application from Mr Snowden, and we cannot therefore speculate on whether any such application would be granted.”

But there was a groundswell of support for Snowden, according to information activist Smári McCarthy, executive director of the International Modern Media Institute in Iceland (IMMI), which has started making inquiries about how Snowden might be given refuge.

“Of course we have been following the story with morbid fascination and as soon as [he] mentioned Iceland, that was our cue to take action,” said McCarthy. “We are working on the basis that if he were to arrive in Iceland we would have a plan in place and ready to go.”

McCarthy’s organisation has requested a meeting with the minister of the interior and is in discussions with lawyers about the possibility of Snowden gaining protection in Iceland. One concern for campaigners is that Iceland has an extradition treaty with the US and that it could be diplomatically difficult for the small nation to grant asylum.

“It is not sure whether Iceland would be up for the fight as the US is a major trading partner,” he said. “However, it would be rather embarrassing for the States if it cut ties with this small nation because it had complied with its human rights duties.”

Snowden would have to arrive on Icelandic soil or at one of its embassies in order to claim asylum, but would have popular support in Iceland, said McCarthy. “Everywhere in the Icelandic media today we are seeing that support, with people thinking that Snowden is deserving of Iceland’s protection.”

Iceland has a history of providing asylum, famously giving former world chess champion Bobby Fischer Icelandic citizenship after a vote in the country’s parliament and is considered a world leader in human rights. The US government is unlikely to deprive Snowden of his nationality as a punishment since that could undermine any attempt to extradite him back to the United States to face charges.

Rendering anyone stateless against their will is formally forbidden by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948, which declares under article 15 that: “(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality; (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.”

Individuals, however, can voluntarily renounce their US citizenship. In order to do so they must, according to the US state department, “appear in person before a US consular or diplomatic officer, in a foreign country (normally at a US embassy or consulate); and sign an oath of renunciation.”

The regulations add: “Persons intending to renounce US citizenship should be aware that, unless they already possess a foreign nationality, they may be rendered stateless and, thus, lack the protection of any government. They may also have difficulty travelling as they may not be entitled to a passport from any country.””

————————————————————–

Douglas McNabb – McNabb Associates, P.C.’s
International Extradition Lawyers Videos:

International Extradition – When the FBI Seeks Extradition

International Extradition – Wire Transfer – Email – Telephone Call

————————————————————–

We previously discussed the extradition treaty between the United States and Hong Kong here.

————————————————————–

To find additional global criminal news, please read The Global Criminal Defense Daily.

Douglas McNabb and other members of the U.S. law firm practice and write and/or report extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition Defense, OFAC SDN Sanctions Removal, International Criminal Court Defense, and US Seizure of Non-Resident, Foreign-Owned Assets. Because we have experience dealing with INTERPOL, our firm understands the inter-relationship that INTERPOL’s “Red Notice” brings to this equation.

The author of this blog is Douglas C. McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

————————————————————–

International criminal defense questions, but want to be anonymous?

Free Skype Tel: +1.202.470.3427, OR

Free Skype call:

           Office Locations

Email:


China (Hong Kong) Extradition Treaty with the United States

April 14, 2011

China (Hong Kong) International Extradition Treaty with the United States

December 20, 1996, Date-Signed

January 21, 1998, Date-In-Force

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE, March 3, 1997. To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification as a treaty, I transmit herewith the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders signed at Hong Kong on December 20, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the Agreement’’). In addition, I transmit for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Agreement. As a treaty, this Agreement will not require implementing legislation.

This Agreement will, upon entry into force, enhance cooperation between the law enforcement communities of the United States and Hong Kong, and will provide a framework and basic protections for extraditions after the reversion of Hong Kong to the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China on July 1, 1997. Given the absence of an extradition treaty with the People’s Republic of China, this Treaty would provide the means to continue an extradition relationship with Hong Kong after reversion and avoid a gap in law enforcement. It will thereby make a significant contribution to international law enforcement efforts.

The provisions of this Agreement follow generally the form and content of extradition treaties recently concluded by the United States. In addition, the Agreement contains several provisions specially designed in light of the particular status of Hong Kong. The Agreement’s basic protections for fugitives are also made expressly applicable to fugitives surrendered by the two parties before the new treaty enters into force.

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Agreement and give its advice and consent to its ratification as a treaty.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON.

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

Department of State

Washington, February 4, 1997

The President
The White House

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong For the Surrender of Fugitive Of- fenders, (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the Agreement’’), signed at Hong Kong on December 20, 1996. I recommend that the Agreement be transferred to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification as a treaty as soon as possible so that it may become effective prior to the reversion of Hong Kong to the sovereignty of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on July 1, 1997. Given the absence of an extradition treaty with the PRC, this US-Hong Kong treaty would provide the means to ensure an ongoing extradition relationship with Hong Kong, avoiding a gap in our law enforcement relationship.

The Agreement follows generally the form and content of extradition treaties recently concluded by the United States. It rep- resents a concerted effort by the Department of State and the Department of Justice to modernize the legal tools available for the extradition of serious offenders such as narcotics traffickers and terrorists and also to address the particular issues related to the status of Hong Kong.

Although entitled an ‘‘Agreement’’ to reflect Hong Kong’s unique juridical status, for purposes of U.S. law, the instrument will be considered to be a treaty, and therefore I am submitting it to you for transmittal to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. In that regard, I note that Hong Kong is entering into the Agreement with the authorization of ‘‘the sovereign government which is responsible for its foreign affairs.’’ At present, that is the United Kingdom. However, the PRC has also approved the Agreement and authorized its continuation in force after July 1, 1997 through approval of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group. For ease of reference, the relevant sovereign is referred to in this report as the PRC although there could be a brief period after the treaty enters into force when the sovereign would still be the United Kingdom.

Article 1 obligates each Party to extradite to the other, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, any person wanted for prosecution or for the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in respect of an offense described in Article 2.

Article 2 contains an extensive list of offenses for which the Par- ties agree to surrender fugitive offenders, provided that the offense is punishable by both parties by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty. Significantly, the Agreement follows the modern dual criminality model by including as the last item in the list of offenses, ‘‘any other offense which is punishable under the laws of both Parties by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty, unless surrender for such offense is prohibited by the laws of the requested Party.’’ Inclusion of this dual criminality clause obviates the need to renegotiate or supplement the Agreement as offenses become punishable under the laws of both Parties. In keeping with most recently negotiated U.S. ex- tradition treaties, the Article further provides that in determining whether an offense is an offense under the law of the requested Party, the conduct of the person shall be examined by reference to the totality of the underlying criminal conduct without reference to the elements of the offense prescribed by the law of the requested Party. Article 2(5) contains the standard provision found in other extradition treaties that an offense under military law shall not be considered to be an offense for purposes of paragraph (1) of this Article.

Article 3, like most modern extradition treaties concluded by the United States, provides that surrender shall not normally be re- fused on the ground that the person sought is a national of the requested Party. However, the executive authority of Hong Kong re- serves the right to refuse surrender of nationals of the PRC in cases in which: (1) the requested surrender relates to the defense, foreign affairs or essential public interest or policy of the PRC, or (2) the person sought neither has the right of abode in Hong Kong nor has entered Hong Kong for the purpose of settlement, and the PRC has jurisdiction over the offense and has commenced or completed proceedings for the prosecution of that person. The executive authority of the United States reserves the same right to refuse the surrender of U.S. nationals on grounds of defense, foreign affairs or essential public interest or policy of the United States of America. Article 3(4) provides that in a case in which the person sought by the United States has neither the right of abode in Hong Kong nor has entered Hong Kong for the purpose of settlement, and the PRC has jurisdiction and is investigating an offense by that person, action on the extradition request by the United States may be deferred until the investigation has been expeditiously concluded. Article 3(5) provides that in cases in which extradition is refused on the grounds of its relation to defense, foreign affairs or essential public interest or policy, the requesting Party may request that the case be submitted to the competent authorities of the requested Party who will consider whether to bring a prosecution. The delegations expressed their shared intention that this Article would rarely be invoked.

Under Article 4, when an offense for which surrender is sought is punishable by death under the laws of the requesting Party and is not so punishable under the laws of the requested Party, the requested Party, may refuse surrender unless the other Party provides assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be carried out. The United States has agreed to a similar formulation in other modern extradition treaties.

Article 5, following modern practice, bars surrender when the person sought has been convicted or acquitted in the requested Party for the same offense, but does not bar extradition if the competent authorities in the requested Party have declined to prosecute or have decided to discontinue criminal proceedings.

Article 6 incorporates a political offense exception to extradition similar to provisions contained in U.S. Extradition treaties concluded in recent years with a number of other countries. After prohibiting extradition for offenses of a political character, the Article expressly excludes from the reach of the exception an offense for which both Parties are obliged pursuant to a multilateral inter- national agreement to extradite the person sought or to submit the case to their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution (e.g., aircraft hijacking pursuant to The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at The Hague December 16, 1970, and entered into force October 14, 1971 aircraft sabotage pursuant to the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal September 23, 1971, and entered into force January 26, 1973, crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomats, under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, done at New York on December 14, 1973, and entered into force February 20, 1977; and hostage taking, pursuant to the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, done at New York on December 17, 1979, and entered into force June 3, 1983, and for the United States January 6. The article likewise excludes from the reach of the political offense exception murder or other willful crime against the person of the head of state of the United States or the PRC or a member of the Head of State’s immediate family. A conspiracy or attempt to commit this offense or the multilateral international agreement offenses described above shall also not be considered to be an offense of a political character.

Article 6 further mandates the denial of extradition if the competent authority of the requested Party, which is expressly designated in the Article as the executive authority in the United States, determines (1) that the request was politically motivated, (2) that the request was made for the primary purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person sought on account of his race, religion, nationality or political opinion, or (3) that the person sought is likely to be denied a fair trial or punished on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions. The United States has agreed to the inclusion of such a comprehensive provision in a few other modern extradition treaties.

Article 7, as in the U.S.-Norway extradition treaty, provides that the competent authority of the requested Party, which is designated as the executive authority in the United States, may in its discretion refuse the surrender of a fugitive when it believes that such surrender is likely to entail exceptionally serious consequences related to the age or health of the fugitive. This provision has rarely been accepted by the United States and the delegations expressed their shared expectation that this Article would apply only in the most unusual and extraordinary circumstances.

Article 8 describes the documents that are required to support a request for extradition, following other modern extradition treaties.

Article 9 establishes the procedures under which documents sub- mitted pursuant to Article 8 shall be received and admitted into evidence in the requested Party. These provisions are also similar to those found in other modern extradition treaties.

Article 10, in keeping with other modern extradition treaties, provides for the provisional arrest and detention of the person sought pending receipt of a fully documented extradition, request in conformity with Article 8. Article 10(5) limits the period that the person sought may be so held to no more than sixty days and explicitly provides that the discharge of the person sought from custody due to lapse of time does not prejudice subsequent rearrest and extradition upon later receipt of the extradition request and supporting documents.

Article 11 again reflects U.S. practice in modern extradition treaties, providing that if the executive authority of the requested Party has received requests for the extradition of a fugitive of- fender from more than one country with which either Party has arrangements for the surrender of fugitive offenders, it shall make its decision having regard to all the circumstances, including the relevant provisions of such agreements or arrangements, the place of commission of the offenses, their relative seriousness, the respective dates of the requests, the nationality of the fugitive offender, the nationality of the victim, and the possibility of subsequent surrender to another jurisdiction.

Article 12 contains provisions on representation and expenses that are similar to those found in other modern extradition treaties. Specifically, the requested Party bears ordinary expenses for the legal representation of the requesting Party in any proceedings arising out of a request for surrender of a fugitive offender. In the event that the requesting Party arranges its own additional legal representation and assistance, it bears any additional expenses incurred. Article 12(3) clarifies that neither Party shall make any pecuniary claim against the other Party arising out of the arrest, detention, examination, or surrender of persons sought under the Agreement.

Pursuant to Article 13, a fugitive offender shall be surrendered only if the evidence is found sufficient according to the law of the requested Party either to justify the committal for trial of the per- son sought if the offense of which he had been accused had been committed in the territory of the requested Party or to establish that he is the person found guilty, convicted or sentenced by the courts of the requesting Party. These requirements are found in many modern U.S. extradition treaties and preserve the ‘‘probable cause’’ standard in cases of requests to the United States.

Article 14 sets forth the standard procedures to govern the surrender and return of fugitive offenders, including the release from custody of a fugitive offender if the requesting Party does not take custody of the person claimed on the date agreed to by the Parties. Like other recent extradition treaties, it provides that, if a request is denied in whole or in part, the requested Party, to the extent permitted under its law, is to provide an explanation of the reasons for the denial and, at the request of the requesting Party, copies of pertinent judicial decisions.

Article 15 follows other modern extradition treaties in providing that when a person is surrendered, the requested Party shall, so far as its law allows and subject to conditions it may impose to protect the rights of other claimants, furnish the requesting Party with all sums of money and other articles which may serve as evidence in the requesting Party’s prosecution or which may have been acquired by the person sought as a result of the offense and are in his or her possession.

Article 16 expressly incorporates into the Agreement a typical formulation of the rule of speciality. It provides, subject to specific exceptions, that a person extradited under the Agreement may not be proceeded against, sentenced or detained with a view to the carrying out of a sentence for any offense committed prior to his surrender other than that for which extradition has been granted unless the requested Party consents. Furthermore, the requesting Party may not surrender or transfer such person beyond its jurisdiction for the offense for which his surrender was granted or for an offense committed prior to his original surrender without the consent of the requested Party. In the case of Hong Kong, this con- sent requirement would apply to any proposed surrender or transfer outside of Hong Kong. The limitations imposed under Article 16 do not apply if the person has had an opportunity to leave the jurisdiction of the Party to which he has been surrendered and has not done so within thirty days or leaves and voluntarily returns.

Article 17, which resembles provisions in most recent United States extradition treaties, provides for the temporary or deferred surrender of persons who are serving a sentence or are being prosecuted in the territory of the requested Party.

Article 18 permits surrender without further proceedings if the person sought gives his consent, as is the case in most modern treaties. It further provides that, to the extent required under the law of the requested Party, the rule of speciality in Article 16 shall apply to such transfers. Although U.S. law does not impose speciality limitations in such cases, the Hong Kong negotiators informed the United States delegation that such speciality limitations apply under Hong Kong law.

Article 19 governs the transit through the territory of one Party of a person being surrendered to the other Party by a third state. As with similar provisions in other recent extradition treaties, it provides that either Party may authorize such transit through its jurisdiction and that the person in transit may be detained in custody during the period of transit.

Article 20 contains final clauses dealing with the Agreement’s entry into force, termination and application. Of particular importance, Paragraph 3 makes the Agreement’s restrictions on capital punishment and on prosecutions and transfers for offenses other than those for which extradition was granted, set forth in Articles 4 and 16, expressly applicable to fugitive offenders who have been surrendered between the parties prior to the Agreement’s entry into force. It also specifies that the Agreement would apply to requests for surrender pending at the date of its entry into force.

Paragraph 1 provides for entry into force thirty days after the date on which the Parties have notified each other in writing that their respective requirements for entry into force have been complied with. Such mutual notification will therefore need to take place no later than May 30 in order to avoid a law enforcement gap upon reversion on July 1.

Paragraph 2 provides for termination six months after receipt of written notice by either Party.

Paragraph 4, like the parallel provision in almost all recent United States ex- tradition treaties, stipulates that the Agreement is retroactive, in the sense that it applies to offenses committed both before and after its entry into force, provided that the offense was an offense under the laws of both parties at the time the request is made.

A Technical Analysis explaining in detail the provisions of the Agreement is being prepared by the United States negotiating delegation and will be submitted separately to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

The Department of Justice joins the Department of State in favoring approval of this Treaty by the Senate at an early date.

Respectfully submitted,

MADELEINE ALBRIGHT.

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Douglas McNabb and other members of the firm practice and write extensively on matters involving Federal Criminal Defense, INTERPOL Red Notice Removal, International Extradition and OFAC SDN List Removal.

The author of this blog is Douglas McNabb. Please feel free to contact him directly at mcnabb@mcnabbassociates.com or at one of the offices listed above.

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